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withdrawal of the UK from the EU, known as Brexit, on 29th of March 2017 the 
UK triggered article 50 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), thus starting 
the two year process in which the EU and UK should determine the conditions 
for UK’s withdrawal from the Union. On 14th of November 2018, as a result 
of Brexit negotiations, an agreement between the EU member-states and the 
UK was endorsed on the withdrawal of the UK from the EU, but the process 
that should have ended on 29th of March 2019 was moved for 31st of October 
2019, due to failure in its ratification in the UK’s Parliament.
Meanwhile and simultaneously with the negotiations and the withdrawal 
procedure, another procedure takes place in the background and it is central 
for this paper.Without explaining the Brexit procedure, the paper elaborates 
the preliminary ruling procedure according article 267 of the Treaty on 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) in the Wightman case and the 
possibility of revoking the notification for withdrawal from the EU according 
article 50 of the TEU. Therefore, besides the case facts that triggered the 
preliminary ruling procedure before the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU), the paper elaborates the significance of the question referred 
tothe Court, for which the Advocate General delivered its opinion and the 
Court delivered its judgment.
Key words: Wightman, Court of Justice, Article 50, Judgment
UDK:341.171(4-672EU:410)
Original Research Paper
123
* Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Goce Delcev – Stip, ivica.josifovic@
ugd.edu.mk
124
CASE FACTS
Article 501
1. Any Member State may decide to withdraw from the Union in 
accordance with its own constitutional requirements. 
2. A Member State which decides to withdraw shall notify the European 
Council of its intention. In the light of the guidelines provided by the European 
Council, the Union shall negotiate and conclude an agreement with that 
State, setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal, taking account of the 
framework for its future relationship with the Union. That agreement shall be 
negotiated in accordance with Article 218(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union. It shall be concluded on behalf of the Union by the 
Council, acting by a qualified majority, after obtaining the consent of the 
European Parliament. 
3. The Treaties shall cease to apply to the State in question from the date 
of entry into force of the withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after 
the notification referred to in paragraph 2, unless the European Council, in 
agreement with the Member State concerned, unanimously decides to extend 
this period. 
4. For the purposes of paragraphs 2 and 3, the member of the European 
Council or of the Council representing the withdrawing Member State shall 
not participate in the discussions of the European Council or Council or in 
decisions concerning it. A qualified majority shall be defined in accordance 
with Article 238(3)(b) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 
5. If a State which has withdrawn from the Union asks to rejoin, its 
request shall be subject to the procedure referred to in Article 49.
The case was brought by several members of the Scottish Parliament 
headed by Andy Wightman, who at the end of 2017, in a proceeding involving 
the UK Parliament, took actions in order to receive an answer from the Scottish 
Court on a simple, but very significant question regarding the unilaterally 
revocation of the article 50 notification to withdraw from EU membership. 
The applicants argued that Brexit is not one-way and that those voting for a 
stay in the EU do not necessarily have to agree on EU and UK arguments that 
there must be “deal or no deal”. Instead, there is a third possibility: people’s 
vote with option to stay in the EU.
In order for the Scottish Court to rule on the legal matter, it must refer 
to the CJEU under article 267 of the TFEU since article 50 of the TEU is a 
provision of the EU law and only the CJEU gives interpretation of the EU 
1  Consolidated versions of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, [2012], OJ 
L C 326/47.
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law for the EU as a whole. Without going into conditions under which the 
CJEU acts in the preliminary ruling procedure, because of the nature of the 
matter and the decisions of national courts, it is worth to mention that the 
CJEU during the years established its own conditions under which gradually 
abandoned the practice to act automatically on referring of national courts, 
determining its own jurisdiction for preliminary ruling. In doing so, it began 
by understanding its role under article 267 of the TFEU as an assistant to 
national courts and not as an advisor on any issues related to the EU law. 
The usual formula in which the conditions for Court’s actions in this regard 
are grouped, says that CJEU shall not act on a question in preliminary ruling 
procedure when: a) the question is obviously not related to the facts and the 
decision to be made; b) the question relates to a hypothetical issue; and/or c) 
when the Court has not been provided with the sufficient factual and legal 
material in order to useful answer to it.So, in February 2018, the Scottish 
Court ruling on the matter submitted for revocation of the notification under 
article 50, found that it was purely hypothetical, that it was not a legal matter 
eligible for judicial review and with no real prospect of success, hence the 
application was rejected, since it was determined that the UK Parliament has 
no desire to withdraw from Brexit.2
However, the applicants appealed to the lower court’s ruling to refer 
the matter to the CJEU. Given the constitutional significance of the matter, 
the judges accepted the appeal and returned the case for reconsideration, 
concluding that the lower court’s judgment wasrather complicated, unclear 
and confusing; that the matter does not fall into those identified as hypothetical 
and for which the CJEU would not have been able to act, given that the UK 
Government could be asked to revoke the notification under article 50 of the 
TEU at the request of the UK Parliament. 
After additional submissions in June 2018, the lower court ruled the 
same because of the hypothetical nature of the matter, thus any possibility to 
refer to the CJEU was rejected.3 During the decision-making, the withdrawal 
act was still in preparation through the UK Parliament and therefore no final 
date for EU withdrawal was confirmed.4 Instead, the date for withdrawal is set 
2 Case P1293/17, Petition of Andrew Wightmanand Others for Judicial review on the issue of 
the unilateral revocability ofa Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union[2018] Opinion of 
Lord Doherty, CSOH 8, <>, accessed 20 August 2019.
3 Case P1293/17, Andrew Wightman and Others for Judicial Review against Secretary of 
State for Exiting the European Union [2018], Opinion of Lord Boyd of Duncansby, CSOH 
61, <https://www.scotcourts.gov.uk/docs/default-source/cos-general-docs/pdf-docs-for-opin-
ions/2018csoh61.pdf?sfvrsn =0>, accessed on 20 August 2019.
4 European Union Withdrawal Act [2018], <http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2018/16/
pdfs/ukpga_20180016_en. pdf> accessed on 20 August 2019.
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only as a matter of EU law under conditions from article 50, paragraph 3 of 
the TEU, i.e. the date of entry into force of the withdrawal agreement or two 
years after the notification of article 50.
As abovementioned, the CJEU does not consider hypothetical questions 
brought by national courts concerning EU law. The preliminary ruling 
procedure is a cooperation between national courts and the CJEU, in order to 
provide assistance to national courts to rule on cases where the interpretation 
of the EU law is essential for resolving the case in front of the national court. 
After considering the question, the lower court found that it was a hypothetical 
question that should not be answered in order to reach a judgment. 
Also, the applicants in their case, objected the UK’s ministers position 
that article 50 could not be unilaterally revoked. The judges rejected any 
detailed discussion on legal suitability of the UK’s minister position for 
revocation of article 50 on grounds that if this is done it would be contrary to 
Parliamentary privilege and contrary to article 9 of Bill of Rights.
The applicants appealed to the higher court where their claim was 
successfully accepted. The judgment of the higher court was delivered on 
21 September 2018 on several grounds.5 First, the UK’s Government claims 
that the judicial review is incompetent because the request was impractical 
was rejected. Second, it is considered that the question is justified because of 
the existence of controversy regarding the Parliamentary process. Third, the 
Court also found that the case is not hypothetical since the first judgment, the 
judgment on appeal and parts of the Withdrawal Act entered into force.
However, Wightman and others claimed that the deadline by 29th of 
March, now 31st of October 2019 does not necessarily refer to “deal or no 
deal”, but instead that there is an alternative according which UK citizens 
could vote for the agreement conditions, including the option to remain in 
the EU. Such option gets even bigger meaning after the failure to apply the 
deadline for UK’s automatic exit that ended on 29th of March or to obtain the 
consent from member-states to extend the article 50 period or to unilaterally 
revoke the notification from article 50 of the TEU. If none of these options can 
be secured or the period until the 31st of October expires, it is clear that there 
will be no enough time to organize a new referendum for UK’s membership 
in the EU.
In their request for a preliminary ruling procedure before the CJEU, the 
Scottish judges approved the text of the question that looked like this: “Where, 
in accordance with Article 50 of the TEU, a Member State has notified the 
5 Case P1293/17,Andy Wightman and Others against Secretary of State for Exiting the 
European Union[2018] opinion of Lord Carloway, CSIH 62 <https://www.scotcourts.gov.
uk/docs/default-source/cos-general-docs/pdf-docs-for-opinions/ 2018csih62.pdf?sfvrsn =0> 
accessed on 21 August 2019.
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European Council of its intention to withdraw from the European Union, does 
EU law permit that notice to be revoked unilaterally by the notifying Member 
State; and, if so, subject to what conditions and with what effect relative to the 
Member State remaining within the EU.”
Given that the time was essential for the case, the Scottish court expressly 
requested the use of expedited procedure under article 105 of the CJEU’s Rules 
of Procedure.6The average time for the CJEU to deliver a judgment according 
the procedure under article 267 of the TFEU is 15.7 months.7Such timeframe, 
four months from the time of referring until the expire of the deadline, before 
the extension, could have made the judgment only a formality, because even 
with the expedited procedure, the Court would need at least five months to 
deliver its judgment. Even this timeframe was problematic, since the UK and 
the EU agreed a settlement of withdrawal on 13th of November 2018.8
However, the Court overcame itself. It received the referring on 3rd of 
October 2018 and because of the seriousness and the expedited procedure it 
started with the first hearing on 27th of November 2018.9The UK Government 
formally opposed to this request on several grounds. First, the UK Government 
issued a political document that the question is still hypothetical and that 
the CJEU overstepped its role.10I disagree with this. As a horizontal judicial 
process for cooperation between national courts and the CJEU, the national 
court is the one to determine the appropriateness of referring a question of the 
EU law to the CJEU.As such, it is the judges who are considering the case to 
assess whether there is a need of referring to the CJEU in order to enable them 
6 Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice of 25 September 2012, [2012] OJ L 265, as 
amended on 18 June 2013, [2013], OJ L 173, on 19 July 2016, [2016], OJ L 217, and on 9 
April 2019, [2019], OJ L 111.
7 Judicial Activity, Annual Report 2017 [2018] <https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/
application/pdf/2018-04/_ra_ 2017_en.pdf> accessed on 22 August 2019.
8 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, 
the Council, The European Central Bank, the European Economic and Social Committee, the 
Committee of the Regions and the European Investment Bank ‘Preparing for the withdrawal of 
the United Kingdom from the European Union on 30 March 2019: a Contingency Action Plan’ 
[2018], COM(2018) 880 final, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:3dd5b905-
e829-11e8-b6 90-01aa75ed71a1.0001.02/DOC_1& format=PDF> accessed 25 August 2019.
9 Alastair Macdonald and Gabriela Baczynska, ‘EU court sets Nov. 27 hearing on Brexit 
reversal case’ Reuters (Brussels 7 November 2018), <https://www.reuters.com/article/
us-britain-eu-ecj/eu-court-sets-nov-27-hearing-on-brexit-reversal-case-idUSKCN 
1NC1NA> accessed 25 August 2019
10 Department for Exiting the European Union, Wightman and Others v Secretary of 
State for Exiting the European Union, (Policy Paper, 6 November 2018), <https://www.
gov.uk/government/publications/wightman-and-others-v-secretary-of-state-for-exiting-
the-european-union/wightman-and-others-v-secretary-of-state-for-exiting-the-european-
union>accessed 25 August 2019.
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to deliver a judgment. Second, if this is the case, than the answer of the CJEU 
is not only advisory, but binding and national judges cannot give their own or 
different or contrary interpretation.
Another UK’s Government approach in taking exception to this 
reference from the Scottish Court was to challenge the process of requesting 
assistance from the CJEU.The Scotland’s Advocate General argued that the 
appropriate course on this matter should have been another appeal to the 
UK’s Supreme Court for adjudication and not for referring to the CJEU. On 
8th of November 2018, the Higher Court, despite the documents submitted in 
order to cancel the referring to the CJEU, ruled out the possibility to refer the 
case to the Supreme Court.11 This clearly shows the poor legal understanding 
of EU law principles. It is a good established doctrine according which the 
preliminary ruling procedure under article 267 of the TFEU is not an appeal 
mechanism and national courts are free to submit requests to the CJEU, free 
of any interference from higher national courts. Member-states Supreme 
courts are also free to issue guidelines for lower courts when they refer to the 
CJEU, as well as the CJEU itself issues guidelines on how these references 
on EU law should be made, although these guidelines cannot restrict the wide 
discretion national courts have in making their decision on the appropriateness 
of referring under article 267 of the TFEU.12
ADVOCATE GENERAL’S BORDONA OPINION
Before looking at the CJEU’s judgment in the Wightman case regarding 
the unilateral revocation of the notification of withdrawal from the EU under 
article 50, it is quite useful to consider the Opinion of Advocate General 
Campos Sanchez Bordona (AG), which, although non-binding, the judges 
carefully examined and worth discussing on issues that raised.13
At the beginning, AG’s opinion rejected the UK’s Government claims 
that the case is hypothetical, because the Government had not decided on 
revoking the notification under article 50 and had no such intention. Further, 
the opinion agrees with the applicants that the notification is in principle 
unilaterally revocable, indicating that article 50 contains nothing regarding 
11 Case P1293/17, Statement of Reasons delivered by Lord Carloway in the reclaiming 
motion by Andy Wightman and Others against Secretary of State for Exiting the European 
Union [2018], <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/ nov/08/uk-cannot-stop-brexit-
article-50-case-going-to-ecj-says-scottish-court> accessed 26 August 2019.
12 Recommendations to national courts and tribunals, in relation to the initiation of preliminary 
ruling proceedings, [2016], OJ L 439/01.
13 Case 621/18, Andy Wightman v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union[2018], 
Opinion of AG Bordona, ECLI:EU:C 2018:978.
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revocation and thus refers to three possible outcomes: no revocation, 
unconditional revocation or conditional revocation.The opinion examines the 
question of unilateral revocation first from an international law aspect and 
then according the article 50 wording.
As for the international law, the opinion gives no concrete answer whether 
the unilateral revocation of the notification for withdrawal from international 
treaty is a matter of international common law, although is stipulated in the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).14The reason for such 
uncertainty is whether the VCLT could apply for EU withdrawal in which 
principles of supremacy and direct effect are in place, just to conclude that it 
cannot be applied, since the EU itself and some of its member-states are not 
parties of the Convention. Still, the AG argues that the VCLT might be useful 
for interpretation of article 50.
As for the interpretation of article 50, literal interpretation does not 
resolve the question, since article 50 do not refer to unilateral revocation of 
the withdrawal notification. Therefore, the AG proceeded on examining the 
context of article 50. It started with the national phase “exclusively for the 
departing member-state”, when deciding for its intention to withdraw, and 
“only conditional upon having been adopted in accordance with that State’s own 
constitutional requirements”.15 The obligation to notify the European Council 
(EC) of the intention to withdraw and the two-year period to negotiate the 
agreement in which that intention will be embodied are only formal elements 
and do not limit the unilateral nature of the initial decision to withdraw.A 
logical consequence is the unilateral authorization to revoke such a decision 
as “a manifestation of that state’s sovereignty”.16 So, the procedure continues 
in “the negotiation phase, which begins with the notification of the intention to 
withdraw to the European Council and culminates two years later, unless there 
is an extension by unanimous decision of the Council”.17 Generally, “as occurs 
in other areas of law, in the absence of an express prohibition or a rule which 
provides otherwise, whoever has unilaterally issued a declaration of intent 
addressed to another party, may retract that declaration until the moment at 
which, by the addressee’s acceptance, conveyed in the form of an act or the 
conclusion of a contract, it produces effects”.18
Next, the opinion notifies that the article 50, paragraph 2 of the TEU 
refers to notification of “intention” of withdrawal, “not the withdrawal itself, 
14 Vienna Convention on the law of treaties,No. 18232, [1969]
15 Case 621/18, Andy Wightman v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union[2018], 
Opinion of AG Bordona …, op. cit., paragraphs 91 and 92.
16  Ibid, paragraph 93.
17  Ibid, paragraph 95
18  Ibid, paragraph 98.
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because withdrawal may only occur after the agreement is reached or, in the 
absence of an agreement, after two years have elapsed”.19 According AG, 
“Intentions are not definitive and may change. Whoever notifies his intention 
to a third party may create an expectation in that party, but does not assume 
an obligation to maintain that intention irrevocably”.20Also, the AG refers to 
two possible scenarios. First, it refers to the possibility that “the withdrawal 
decision may be annulled, if the body having authority (ordinarily the highest 
courts of each State) holds that that decision was not adopted in accordance 
with the constitutional requirements”.21Second, “as a result of action carried 
out in accordance with its constitutional requirements (for example, a 
referendum, a meaningful vote in Parliament, the holding of general elections 
which produce an opposing majority, among other cases), the member-state’s 
initial decision is reversed and the judicial and constitutional basis on which 
it was sustained subsequently disappears”, for which “that State can and must 
notify that change to the European Council”.22Under these circumstances, on 
the one hand, “to insist on negotiating the agreement for withdrawing from 
the Treaties … is a result contrary to common sense”, and on other hand, 
accepting the withdrawal shall “respect” the role of national parliament as part 
of member-state’s national identity.23The possibility of rejoining the EU is not 
contrary to this interpretation, since there is no logic to spend the article 50 
two-year period on negotiating future membership. And as we will see below 
from the CJEU’s judgment, a member-state remains a member-state during 
the article 50 period.24
Regarding the argument on unilateral revocation, the AG is on a 
standpoint that it will strengthen the Treaties provision for “closer union”, 
“national identities of the member-states”, and “protection of the rights acquired 
by EU citizens” and that all this is part of historical background of previous 
versions of article 50 and that supports the same outcome.25 However, the AG 
point out the existence of several conditions. First, there must be a formal 
notification of revocation, according the notification to withdraw. Second, 
national constitutional requirements must be respected. While accepting that 
“this is an issue which falls to be determined by each member-state”, he argues 
that the in UK, the condition include “prior parliamentary authorisation for the 
notification of the intention to withdraw” and logically “the revocation of that 
19  Ibid, paragraph 99.
20  Ibid, paragraph 100.
21  Ibid, paragraph 104.
22  Ibid, paragraph 105.
23  Ibid, paragraph 106.
24  Ibid, paragraph 114.
25  Ibid, paragraphs 129-135.
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notification also requires parliamentary approval”. Third, there is no need to 
justify the revocation of notification of withdrawal.26
The AG paid attention on temporal limit under article 50, paragraph 2 of 
the TEU, as well as on limits under article 4, paragraph 3 regarding principles 
of good faith and sincere cooperation. According the temporal limit under 
article 50, paragraph 2 of the TEU, the revocation “is possible only within 
the two-year negotiation period that begins when the intention to withdraw 
is notified to the European Council” and “once the withdrawal agreement has 
been formally concluded, which implies the agreement of both parties, it is no 
longer possible to revoke the notification”.27Regarding principles of good faith 
and sincere cooperation under article 4, paragraph 3 of the TEU, the European 
Commission and the Council raised concerns that member-state “could 
revoke its notification and halt the negotiations if they were not favourable 
to it” and “resubmit its notification of intention to withdraw, thus triggering a 
new two-year negotiation period”, thusbypassing the time constraints of the 
process.28But, the AG rejected these arguments: “the possibility that a right 
may be abused or misused is, generally speaking, not a reason to deny the 
existence of that right”.29Rather, the abuse must be prevented through the use of 
the appropriate legal instruments. The established principle of misuse of rights 
must be “be applied in the context of Article 50, if a member-state engaged in 
an abusive practice of using successive notifications and revocations in order 
to improve the terms of its withdrawal from the European Union”.30
There is no indication that every misuse is planned and “any abuse could 
occur only when a second notification of the intention to withdraw is submitted, 
but not by unilaterally revoking the first”.31In AG’s standpoint, a large number 
of “tactical revocations” would be extremely difficult, as the revocation is 
a decision adopted in “accordance with its constitutional requirements” and 
thus functions as a “filter which acts as a deterrent in order to prevent the 
abuse of the withdrawal procedure laid down in Article 50 TEU through such 
tactical revocations”.32At the end, the opinion accepts that the revocation may 
be agreed, in case of request by member-state and unanimous decision of the 
EC.
So, what can we say about this review of the AG Bordona’s opinion 
before going into the essence of the judgment. First, the opinion strongly 
26  Ibid, paragraphs 143-145.
27  Ibid, paragraph 147.
28  Ibid, paragraphs 149-150.
29  Ibid, paragraph 152.
30  Ibid, paragraph 153.
31  Ibid, paragraph 155.
32  Ibid, paragraph 156.
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argues that the matter is not hypothetical. It rightly refers to the CJEU’s case-
law according which references from national are considered as relevant; 
such assumption could only be refused in limited cases. There was a strong 
argument for the CJEU to answer on the referring, otherwise the possibility 
of holding another referendum in case the unilateral revocation was denied 
would still be an open question.The basic argument for unilateral revocation 
is double and simultaneous: first, regarding the importance of the notion 
“intention” and second emphasis on the sovereign power of decision-making 
by member-states. Regarding the protection measures against abuse, although 
it is at least convincing that national constitutional requirements would not 
always play as a filter, it is better to specify what limitations – probably in the 
form of rejection to review the notification one or two years after the previous 
notification or extending the article 50 process where the last process stopped 
– would be applicable.
Unfortunately, the opinion is unclear regarding the time limitation, 
especially delivered during negotiation among the EU and the UK, and 
especially that the AG did not took into account the possibility of extending 
the deadline (which actually happened, extending it until 31st of October 2019) 
and how would this affect the unilateral revocation.Would the notification be 
only possible within a two-year period or, also, during the extension of that 
period? The opinion is contradictory in parts; the judgment explained below 
is not. The possibility of delaying the withdrawal agreement deadline, which 
is not mentioned in the opinion, but mentioned in the judgment, means that 
the revocation is possible during the extension of that deadline.The revocation 
with consent could not simply fit in the literal meaning of article 50, since 
there is no process of approval. Further, since there is no need of consent and 
approval, it is probably that every member-state would consider the unilateral 
revocation.
In general, AG’s opinion is a support for those proposing unilateral 
revocation and in favour of the applicants. Regardless of whether it changes the 
political dynamics, it is less probably that there may be a second referendum 
with different outcome in favour of those supporting the EU membership.
THE CJEU JUDGMENT IN WIGHTMAN CASE
If we look at the judgment, from the beginning it can be seen that it 
confirms that the UK may unilaterally revoke the notification of the intention 
to withdraw from the EU in the most general terms, thus broadly following 
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the non-binding opinion of AG’s Bordona.33First, the Court rejects the UK’s 
argument that the matter is hypothetical and supports national courts to refer 
questions to the CJEU about the EU law.34
On the merits, the Court refers that “the interpretation of a provision 
of EU law requires that account be taken not only of its wording and the 
objectives it pursues, but also of its context and the provisions of EU law as 
a whole”.35As regards the wording of article 50, the Court noted that article 
50 does not explicitly address the subject of revocation, neither expressly 
prohibits nor expressly authorises revocation. But, the Court, as pointed by 
the AG in his opinion, indicates that article 50 refers to notification of the 
“intention” to withdraw. “An intention is, by its nature, neither definitive nor 
irrevocable”.36
Observing that the withdrawal decision is one-sided in accordance with 
member-state’s constitutional requirements, the Court ruled that „the Member 
State is not required to take its decision in concert with the other Member States 
or with the EU institutions. The decision to withdraw is for that Member State 
alone to take, in accordance with its constitutional requirements, and therefore 
depends solely on its sovereign choice“.37
As for the objectives of article 50, the Court pursues two objectives: 
“first, enshrining the sovereign right of a Member State to withdraw from 
the European Union and, secondly, establishing a procedure to enable such a 
withdrawal to take place in an orderly fashion”.38As stated by AG, it further 
locates the matter on revocation as part of the first of these objectives, thus 
linking the revocation with the sovereign decision for withdrawal: „the 
sovereign nature of the right of withdrawal enshrined in Article 50(1) TEU 
supports the conclusion that the Member State concerned has a right to revoke 
the notification of its intention to withdraw from the European Union, for as 
long as a withdrawal agreement concluded between the European Union and 
that Member State has not entered into force or, if no such agreement has been 
concluded, for as long as the two-year period laid down in Article 50(3) TEU, 
possibly extended in accordance with that provision, has not expired“.39 As 
the withdrawal period is extended until 31st of October 2019, it is clear that 
unilateral right to revoke the notification still exists. AG’s opinion on this is 
33 Case 621/18, Andy Wightman v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union[2018] 
ECLI:EU:C:2018:999.
34  Ibid, paragraph 30.
35  Ibid, paragraph 47.
36  Ibid, paragraphs 48 and 49.
37  Ibid, paragraph 50.
38  Ibid, paragraph 56.
39  Ibid, paragraph 57
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somewhat contrary on this, as it represents a key point since the extension 
would not be further needed if a second referendum on Brexit occurs.
Another question that raises are the rules applicable on unilateral 
revocation. Since article 50 is silent, the Court said that same rules are 
applied for the revocation as those applied in the notification for withdrawal: 
“it may be decided upon unilaterally, in accordance with the constitutional 
requirements of the Member State concerned”.40The Court also confirmed that 
the revocation would mean that the UK keeps its status as a member-state, as the 
revocation would reflect “a sovereign decision by that State to retain its status 
as a Member State of the European Union, a status which is not suspended or 
altered by that notification”.41The “revocation is fundamentally different in 
that respect from any request by which the member-state concerned might ask 
the European Council to extend the two-year period and the Court rejected 
the analogy that the Commission and the Council seek to make between that 
revocation and such an extension request.42
As regards the article 50 context, the Court emphasized the articles 1 
and 2 of the TEU for “ever closer union among the peoples of Europe”, EU 
citizenship and liberty and democracy,43 and that “the European Union is 
composed of States which have freely and voluntarily committed themselves 
to those values”, and also “any withdrawal of a Member State from the 
European Union is liable to have a considerable impact on the rights of all 
Union citizens, including, inter alia, their right to free movement, as regards 
both nationals of the Member State concerned and nationals of other Member 
States”.44Therefore, “given that a State cannot be forced to accede to the 
European Union against its will, neither can it be forced to withdraw from 
the European Union against its will”, and that would be the case if “Member 
State could be forced to leave the European Union despite its wish – as 
expressed through its democratic process in accordance with its constitutional 
requirements – to reverse its decision to withdraw and, accordingly, to remain 
a Member of the European Union”.45
Also, the Court looks at the origins of article 50 when different 
amendments were rejected “on the ground, expressly set out in the comments 
on the draft, that the voluntary and unilateral nature of the withdrawal decision 
should be ensured”. Moreover, the Court’s findings were corroborated with 
the VCLT “which was taken into account” when previous version of article 50 
40  Ibid, paragraph 58.
41  Ibid, paragraph 59.
42  Ibid, paragraph 61.
43  Ibid, paragraphs 61 and 62.
44  Ibid, paragraphs 63 and 64.
45  Ibid, paragraphs 65 and 66.
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was drafted. The Convention indicates that “in clear and unconditional terms 
that a notification of withdrawal … may be revoked at any time before it takes 
effect”.46
Next, the Court rejects the Council’s and Commission’s argument that 
the revocation requires unanimous approval by the EC as it “would transform 
a unilateral sovereign right into a conditional right subject to an approval 
procedure”, and it “would be incompatible with the principle…that a Member 
State cannot be forced to leave the European Union against its will”.47
Finally, the Court presents the conditions for revocation: 
- the revocation must happen before entering in force the Withdrawal 
Agreement (or if there is no such agreement, in period of two-years under 
article 50);
- the revocation must be submitted in writing to the European Council; 
and
the revocation must be “unequivocal and unconditional that is to say 
that the purpose of that revocation is to confirm the EU membership of the 
Member State concerned”.48
CONCLUSION
The CJEU judgment will probably have no impact on the possibility 
that the Brexit could be reversed. The Wightman judgment, more than the 
AG’s opinion, strongly supports the unilateral revocation of the notification 
on best possible conditions. The admissibility of the case is not surprising and 
is related to previous case-law referring to national courts. As the Court said, 
article 50 makes no reference to the revocation and it does not necessarily 
have to indicate the resolution of the matter, but it is right when pointed out 
that there is an explicit reference to the intention to withdraw.
Also, the judgment secured important additional information regarding 
the Brexit process. The Court accepted the arguments that the notification 
of intention to withdraw from the EU could unilaterally be revoked by the 
UK without the consent of other EU member-states. This is important and 
could strengthen the argument that the UK Government could hold a second 
referendum with a choice of people’s voice to remain in the EU.
The Court’s judgment on unilateral revocation of the notification 
confirms the nature of the first UK decision which was not “approved” or 
filtered by EU institutions after receipt of the notification. The parallel which 
46  Ibid, paragraphs 68-71.
47  Ibid, paragraph 72.
48  Ibid, paragraphs 73 and 74.
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the judgment draws between the notification and the revocation suggest that 
there can be no review by EU institutions on revocation, since it is confirmed 
that it meets the minimum requirements set by the Court.
As far as the international law, it is contrary to the usual autonomy of the 
EU law from international law for which the Court refers to at the outset of the 
judgment, but the Court justifies it as the drafters of what become article 50 
took into account the VCLT.
Finally, on revocation conditions, the written notification is simple: 
EU institutions could determine whether the revocation is genuine or not 
and the requirement for “unequivocal and unconditional” revocation suggest 
that the notification must confirm that the UK has no intention to renegotiate 
its membership or send another notification shortly after. Implicitly, if the 
revocation was of these reasons then a legal question will arise on what the EC 
could do: it might refuse to accept the notification, with the UK challenging 
the decision; simply to decide to refuse to renegotiate for membership; or 
to accept the new withdrawal notification if it is followed shortly after the 
revocation of the first notification. 
However, in my opinion, the judgment is somewhat disappointing. It 
failed to secure significant conditions regarding the crucial question related to 
revocation of notification from article 50. But, in these condition, the Court 
makes no mention of the condition noted in AG’s opinion that the revocation 
must be in good faith and sincere cooperation, which is very difficult to apply 
in practice. This is a useful information, because if the UK change its mind 
about Brexit and change its decision of withdrawal in accordance with its 
constitutional requirements and give written notification to the EC for such 
decision before 31st of October 2019 or later in case the withdrawal day to be 
extended with another agreement between UK and EU member-states, the UK 
may remain in the EU under unchanged terms. This is important, as there were 
suggestions that if UK wishes to remain in the EU it may need the consent of 
other member-states that may use the UK’s weak negotiating position in order 
to eliminate benefits which the UK currently enjoys.
Also, the Court, unlike the AG, makes no mention of the domestic process 
that led to the revocation, indicating only that it needs to be in accordance 
with the UK’s constitutional requirements. Overall, the judgment tells us that 
the Brexit process could be reversed if UK wishes to, but it is irrelevant as 
long as the Government is not considering such thing. It is not quite certain 
whether the revocation would require a new referendum under the EU law. 
The Court’s judgment for three times refers to revocation decision through 
“democratic process”, but in the judgment’s operational part it refers only to 
“constitutional requirements”. Some might argue that it would be undemocratic 
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to reverse the Brexit decision without referendum. However, representative 
democracy is the best form of democratic decision-making. Further, under the 
UK’s constitutional system, the Parliament remains the supreme legislative 
authority, so if the Parliament decides to change the Brexit decision, such 
decision must be in accordance with the UK’s constitutional requirements.
However, thanks to the CJEU judgment, the UK could take a decision to 
reverse Brexit until 31st of October 2019, thus remaining in the EU on existing 
conditions. Still, this is not a useful information, since it is unlikely that the UK 
will manage to take final decision in the next few months. For one reason, a 
new referendum takes at least a 22 months organization. This means that even 
if the UK Government decides to hold a new referendum to reverse Brexit it 
will require the consent of EU member-states for new extension of the period 
in order to have time to organize the voting.
The UK Government asked the Court to refuse to rule on ground that 
the referring question by the Scottish Court was hypothetical since the UK 
Government gave no indication that it wishes to revoke the notification. 
Since the CJEU decided to rule it should have tried to give useful directions. 
Unfortunately, it ended with a decision which applies only in extremely 
unlikely scenario in which the UK definitely gives up from Brexit by 31st of 
October 2019 and that gives a little useful direction regarding the key question 
that preoccupied the Council and the Commission, and that is the potential for 
abuse of right in order to avoid time limitations imposed by article 50.
